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PASSING OVER THE CONFLICT. THE CHU TALAS BASIN 
AGREEMENT AS A MODEL FOR CENTRAL ASIA? 
Kai Wegerich
Although Smith (1995: 351), focusing on water 
sharing, was writing in the mid 1990s that 
“nowhere in the world is the potential for conﬂict 
over the resources as strong as in Central Asia”, 
a recent publication, based on a NATO-sponsored 
advanced research workshop (20-22 June 2006 in 
Almaty, Kazakhstan), is called “Transboundary 
water resources: a foundation for regional stability 
in Central Asia” (Moerlins et al., 2008). Hence, 
the impression is given that, after nearly ten years 
of stagnation and conﬂict potential over water 
resources in Central Asia, a new era of cooperation 
has emerged. The success story promoted for 
Central Asian water cooperation involves the Chu 
and Talas basin and the 2000 agreement between 
the riparian states, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. 
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The international community celebrated the Chu Talas basin agreement as a major breakthrough for water 
management in Central Asia where, until recently, the potential for conﬂict over water resources was rated as very 
high. The agreement is presented internationally as a model for Central Asia. It is argued that the lessons learned 
from this case could be transferred to the larger Central Asian rivers. Here, it is attempted to give an historical 
account on water sharing in the Talas basin, on other Central Asian water agreements, and on the foci of the 
international community (SPECA). Furthermore, the paper questions whether the knowledge gained from this 
basin can or even should be utilized for other Central Asian rivers.
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agreed to share the operation and maintenance 
costs of the transboundary infrastructure. 
“The Parties assume an individual share in 
compensation of operation and maintenance costs 
on water distribution facilities of interstate use 
and other co-ordinated activities proportionally 
to received water amount” (Article 4). After the 
agreement was ratiﬁed by Kazakhstan in 2002, 
the international organizations started to support 
the operationalization of the agreement – the 
establishment of a joint commission. “To ensure 
safe and reliable operation of water distribution 
facilities of interstate use the Parties will establish 
permanent functioning commissions to arrange 
work regime and determine necessary amount 
of costs on their operation and technical service” 
(Article 5).
Until its promotion as a success story, the Chu-
Talas basin received hardly any attention in the 
international literature. An exception was the US 
Agency for International Development (USAID) 
report by Hutchens (1999) on cost sharing for 
the operation and maintenance of transboundary 
infrastructure in different basins in Central Asia. It 
was only in the early 2000s that the Chu-Talas basin 
appeared in the academic literature. Sievers (2002) 
mentions the 2000 agreement on the Chu-Talas 
between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, shortly after its 
ratiﬁcation in 2002. Since then, this agreement and 
the Chu-Talas basin have received more attention, 
especially from the international community – the 
UN Special Program for the Economies of Central 
Asia (SPECA), the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (Nordstrom, 
2007), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) (ADB, 
2006) - which started to celebrate the agreement 
as a breakthrough, or ground breaking, for Central 
Asia. The Chu-Talas basin agreement was even 
internationally presented and promoted as a model 
for cooperation in Central Asia (UNESCO – 
PCCP, 2004a; SIWI, 2007). With the international 
agencies involved, the internationally shared 
knowledge about the Chu-Talas basin increased 
(Demydenko, 2004; Krutov and Spoor, 2006; 
Rodina et al., 2008; Bure, 2008). In this literature, 
reference is often made to the pre-existing good 
relations and informal networks that led to the 
agreement on cost sharing. Here, it is attempted 
to give an historical account on water sharing 
in the Talas basin, on other Central Asian water 
agreements, and on the foci of the international 
community (SPECA). 
The chapter is based on a literature review of 
conference papers together with information 
available on the newly established Chu-Talas web 
page (Transboundary Chu-Talas River project, 
2007a, 2007b) and on web pages of the international 
community, mainly the UNESCO web page – 
from Potential Conﬂict to Co-operation Potential 
(PCCP) (UNESCO – PCCP, 2004b, 2004c)1. 
Fieldwork was carried out in the Talas basin in 
July and August 2007. Interviews were conducted 
with staff of the Chu-Talas Basseinovoye Vodnoye 
Obyedineniye (BVO: Basin Water Organization), 
the Dzhambul Province Public Water Management 
Enterprises (RGP), managers from the Kyrgyz 
Kirov reservoir and other local water experts in 
Almaty and Dzhambul Provinces. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as 
follows. The next section presents brieﬂy the 
concept of discourse and how success stories 
are created. This is followed by a geographical 
description of the Talas basin. The fourth, ﬁfth 
and sixth sections focus on the international level 
within Central Asia as well as the operation of the 
Kirov reservoir, by interpreting the data from the 
Pekrovka metering station during the Soviet Union 
era, in the 1990s, and from 2000 onwards. The 
seventh section summarizes and concludes.
2 Controlling the discourse
Hajer (1997) shows how policy discourses frame 
certain problems, distinguishing some aspects of 
a situation rather than others. In their research on 
water politics, Zeitoun and Warner (2006: 448) 
identify knowledge construction and sanctioning 
the discourse as hegemonic compliance-
producing mechanisms. They argue that these two 
mechanisms “in the world of water conﬂicts may 
serve to veil certain aspects of riparian relations 
while emphasizing others”. Their focus is on river 
basins and how riparian states claim water shares; 
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nevertheless, they (2006: 450) identify the role of 
international agencies, stating: “donor and bank 
funding is not necessarily neutral or equitably 
distributed”. They support their claim by quoting 
Waterbury (2002) who links stafﬁng and ﬁnancial 
contributions of states with the international 
interventions. 
However, agency interventions have to show 
results. Mosse (2004: 646), evaluating critically 
a development project in India, argues that it is 
“not whether a project succeeds, but how success 
is produced”. Rap (2006: 1301) starts his paper 
on the policy model of irrigation management 
transfer in Mexico by paraphrasing a George W. 
Bush statement (interview with Associated Press, 
18 January 2001) stating: “to succeed, you need to 
demonstrate success and dissociate yourself from 
failure”. Mosse (2004: 646) reasons that “success 
in development depends upon the stabilization 
of a particular interpretation”. Hence, control 
over the interpretation of certain developments 
is important. The more often the interpretations 
are restated and adopted by different authoritative 
sources, the more stable they become.
3 Geographical background of the 
Talas basin
The basin commonly referred to as Chu-Talas is 
formed mainly on the Kyrgyz ridge. It consists of 
Figure 1: The Talas river. Source: UNESCO – PCCP (2004b); Demydenko (2004)  
three main rivers, the Asa, the Chu and the Talas, 
which are formed by the conﬂuence of many 
small rivers. Here the focus is on the Talas river 
only (Figure 1). The Talas river is formed by the 
conﬂuence of the Karakol and Uchkosha rivers 
within Kyrgyzstan and vanishes in Moinkum sands 
in the territory of Kazakhstan. In total, the river is 
661 km long and its watershed is 52,700 km2, of 
which 22 percent is in Kyrgyzstan and 78 percent 
in Kazakhstan. The ﬂow of the river is formed by 
seasonal snowmelt and partially by glaciers from 
the Kyrgyz mountains. Krutov and Spoor (2006: 4) 
state that “about 80 percent” of the ﬂow is formed 
in Kyrgyzstan. The total water resource in the basin 
is estimated at 1.5 km3. 
Demydenko (2004: slide 33) states that “The 
average elevation of the river’s watershed area varies 
from 2,500 to 2,700 m above sea level. The climate 
of the Talas River basin is continental with winter 
period precipitations varying between 400-500 
mm”. Krutov and Spoor (2006: 5) argue that “the 
considerably warm spring and summer from May 
to September practically do not contribute to the 
river ﬂow”. On the other hand, available data from 
the Talas metering station in Kyrgyzstan indicate 
that precipitation during the spring months could 
contribute to the river ﬂow. See Table 1 for average 
temperature, and Table 2 for precipitation statistics, 
Talas metering station.
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The Talas river is dominated by the Kirov reservoir, 
which is the only transboundary reservoir in 
the basin. The reservoir is situated on Kyrgyz 
territory, close to the border with Kazakhstan. The 
reservoir was commissioned in 1973, completed 
in 1975, and started operation in 1976. Its design 
capacity is 0.55 km3. The main purpose of the 
reservoir was to control the ﬂow of the Talas river 
for the irrigated agriculture areas mainly in the 
downstream Kazakh territory (Demydenko, 2004). 
Krutov and Spoor (2006: 7) explain further: “it 
has been used to regulate ﬂows to the downstream 
areas, to provide additional water during the early 
and late parts of the vegetation period (April-May, 
August-September)”. Currently, within the Talas 
basin, there are 114,900 hectares of irrigated land 
in Kyrgyzstan and 79,300 hectares in Kazakhstan. 
Demydenko (2004: slide 40) states: “in earlier 
times, the total irrigated land in the Kazakh part of 
the basin was almost equal to the irrigated area in 
the Kyrgyz part”. In Kazakhstan the irrigated areas 
are close to the Kyrgyz border; here the width of 
the valley is twenty-ﬁve to thirty kilometres; after 
an artiﬁcial lake (approximately sixty kilometres 
North of Taraz city, capital of Dzhambul Province) 
the width of the valley reduces to only one to two 
kilometres (Figure 2). 
To date, no historical account has been provided on 
joint cooperation or the reasons which triggered the 
agreement. The following sections structure the events 
according to the decades 1980s, 1990s and 2000s.
4 Water management in the 1980s
4.1 Water management within Central Asia
Within the basin framework, most dams and 
reservoirs were built upstream in the mountains of 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, whereas the irrigation 
areas were downstream in the valleys and in the 
steppes. The water-management constructions 
were built to facilitate irrigated agriculture in the 
downstream regions. This reasoning is appropriate 
for the Toktogul dam located in the Syr Darya 
basin and for the Kirov in the Talas basin, both 
in upstream Kyrgyzstan, but it cannot be applied 
to the Nurek dam in Tajikistan (Wegerich et al., 
2007). In order to use the dams for agricultural 
purposes, water had to be released in the vegetation 
season to satisfy irrigation demands.
Figure 2: Talas river, its tributaries and irrigated area. Source: adapted from Demydenko (2004)
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1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
January -6.1 -1.2 -6.6 -2.5 -2.2 -2.3 -4.5 -7.2 -2.6
February -3.0 -2.1 -2.2 -1.5 -1.6 0.7 -5.9 1.7 0.4
March -3.5 3.3 5.4 5.4 2.1 1.5 7.1 6.5 3.0
April 9.2 12.7 10.6 8.4 6.7 6.1 10.7 11.6 13.2
May 16.0 16.3 17.9 13.5 13.1 11.9 14.2 16.1 15.6
June 17.3 19.6 22.0 18.5 18.7 17.9 20.5 19.3 20.5
July 19.4 21.7 20.6 20.9 20.8 20.4 22.2 19.9 21.3
August 21.4 21.0 19.8 21.5 20.4 19.3 18.5 20.2 20.0
September 15.9 15.4 14.1 15.9 15.7 15.3 16.8 14.6 16.0
October 11.1 6.0 7.6 11.5 10.0 8.2 10.6 11.7 7.3
November 2.4 0.5 4.3 4.3 2.4 5.9 3.4 3.7 5.3
December 0.7 -0.7 -3.7 -6.4 -1.8 -2.0 -1.3 -3.4 -5.3
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
January   39.6 46.0 40.9 27.2
February   48.0 56.4 53.3 11.2
March  7.1 43.2 67.4 80.5 57.0
April  41.8 58.8 121.7 84.6 38.5
May  37.7 42.4 113.4 86.3 35.1
June  26.3 21.0 62.3 79.4 5.3
July  9.9 54.1 46.4 58.3  
August  1.5 55.3 24.1 44.5
September  2.7 23.3 14.3 26.3
October  57.1 112.3 34.8 48.3
November  40.7 39.7 23.6 67.6  
December  18.3 47.9 73.9 21.3
Total  243.1 585.6 684.3 691.3 174.3
Table 1: Average temperature at Talas metering station (1999-2007). Source: http://meteo.infospace.ru
Table 2: Precipitation at Talas metering station (1999-2004).  Source: http://meteo.infospace.ru
4.2 Water management within the Talas 
basin
During the Soviet era, the Kyrgyz SSR and the 
Kazakh SSR signed an agreement on water sharing 
in the Talas basin in Moscow on January 31, 1983. 
Under the agreement it was decided to share the 
ﬂow within the Talas basin equally – 50 percent to 
each republic. The 1983 protocol assumes a mean 
annual ﬂow of 1616 million m3 in the Talas basin. 
Kazakhstan’s share has two components. The main 
component is the discharge from the Kirov reservoir 
of 716 million m3, the remaining 92 million m3 
are formed within Kazakhstan’s own territory. The 
agreement determines that Kazakhstan should 
receive 579.6 million m3 from the Kirov reservoir 
(measured at the Pekrovka metering station) in 
the vegetation period (April to September) and 
in the non-vegetation period (October to March), 
an amount of 136.4 million m3. The Pekrovka 
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metering station is just upstream from the republic 
boundary, on Kyrgyz’ territory. (Figure 3). Since 
at the time both countries were uniﬁed within the 
Soviet Union, both received their funding from 
the Ministry of Water Resources. Kemelova and 
Zhalkubaev (2003: 480), writing on transboundary 
water issues in the Syr Darya basin, state that “the 
USSR budget contributed roughly US$600 million 
to Kyrygzstan’s budget annually”. Therefore, the 
1983 protocol makes no reference to the operation 
and maintenance costs of the reservoir. 
It is questionable how the 1983 protocol was 
implemented during the Soviet Union. Demydenko 
(2004: slide 48) shows a graph with planned and 
Figure 3: Simpliﬁed schematic of Talas river system. Source: adapted from Hutchens (1999)
actual releases from the Kirov reservoir for the year 
1986. According to him, even during the Soviet 
Union, Kyrgyzstan delivered less water than the 
requested distribution. However, it is not evident 
to what the term requested distribution in his 
presentation refers, whether it relates to the protocol 
or to an irrigation plan for Dzhambul Province for 
a particular year. In addition, one has to question 
whether the ﬂow for the year 1986 is representative 
for the Soviet Union period after 1983. 
Data provided directly by the Chu-Talas BVO 
(Kazakhstan) for the Pekrovka metering station 
show that, at least in the two years (1987 and 1988) 
for which ﬁgures were made available, more water 
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Figure 4: Data mentioned in Annex to the 1983 agreement and data from the Pekrovka metering station for the years 1987 
and 1988 (million m3).  Source: Dzhambul Irrigation Department
5 Water management in the 1990s
5.1 Water management within Central Asia 
After independence, the basin was divided between 
two independent countries, and therefore the basin 
water management framework could have been at 
risk. Nevertheless, shortly after independence in 
1991, the governments of the newly independent 
Central Asian states agreed to continue with the 
principles of water allocation that had prevailed 
in the USSR. The Almaty Agreement, signed in 
February 1992 by representatives of Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan, acknowledged joint management of 
water resources. “Under the agreement the states 
retained their Soviet-period water allocations, 
refrained from project infringements on other states 
and promised an open exchange of information” 
(O’Hara, quoted in Horsman, 2001: 73).
Instead of disputes arising in relation to water 
allocations, problems arose between the 
riparian states on transboundary water-provision 
infrastructure. Within the Amu Darya basin, 
transboundary water-provision infrastructures 
are the pump stations located in Turkmenistan 
and providing water to Uzbekistan, and the 
Tuyamuyun reservoir located in Turkmenistan and 
providing water to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 
In April 1996, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan 
came to a bilateral agreement. According to this 
agreement, Uzbekistan pays to Turkmenistan US$ 
11.4 million annually as land rent for the Bukhara 
and Kashkardarya pump stations and for the water 
storage area of Tuyamuyun and in addition covers 
all the operation and maintenance costs (which 
include visas for maintenance personal and 
transport) (Wegerich, 2006).
Within the Syr Darya basin, tension between 
upstream and downstream riparian states arose not 
in relation to water allocation, but in relation to 
the shift from operating the Toktogul reservoir for 
downstream irrigation in the summer months to 
winter releases in order to increase the availability 
reached Pekrovka during the vegetation period 
than the mean annual ﬂow ofﬁcially stated in the 
protocol (total during the vegetation period of 
776.4m. m3 and 876.6m. m3 for 1987 and 1988, 
respectively). Therefore, it appears that during 
the time of the Soviet Union Kyrgyzstan released 
additional water to support irrigated agriculture in 
downstream Kazakhstan. 
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of energy upstream (hydropower). The use of 
water for energy production did not change the 
regional allocation of water, only the timing of 
releases. In addition, Kyrgyzstan began to demand 
payment from the downstream riparian states 
(Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) for the use of water 
from its reservoirs. Pressure from USAID resulted 
in the establishment of a barter agreement (Lange, 
2001; Weinthal, 2001). On 17 March 1998, the 
governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan adopted an interstate agreement on 
use of water and energy resources of the Syr Darya 
river basin.
Following this agreement, SPECA was launched 
in 1998. Its goal was to strengthen sub-regional 
cooperation in Central Asia. The Project Working 
Group (PWG-Energo) was established as an 
instrument for the implementation of SPECA 
(PWG-Energo reports). Its priority program is 
cooperation on “rational and efﬁcient use of energy 
and water resources of the economies of Central 
Asia”. The focus on energy and water already 
suggests that the main focus could be on the Syr 
Darya basin. It should be emphasized that, even 
though Afghanistan is mentioned as a member of 
SPECA, it is not mentioned in any of the PWG-
Energo meeting reports. The meeting reports 
show that Kyrgyzstan played a major role in this 
initiative. Kyrgyzstan not only hosted the meetings, 
but also early on in the meetings main speeches 
were given by high Kyrgyz politicians. From the 
start, the initiative has been ignored by Uzbekistan. 
Even during the ﬁrst meeting (20-21 November 
1998 in Bishkek), Uzbekistan was only represented 
by the plenipotentiary representative of Uzbekistan 
in the Executive Council of the Inter-State 
Council of the Economic Union of Central Asia. 
At the second meeting (Bishkek: 8-9 July 1999), 
neither Turkmenistan nor Uzbekistan was present. 
As these downstream states were absent from the 
meeting, the agenda that was set was dictated by 
upstream interests: 
    Rational and efﬁcient use of energy and water 
resources of the economies of Central Asia can 
and should be assured through establishing 
treaty-based relations based on equitable and 
reasonable sharing. They should provide for 
mutual compensation of the participating 
countries for the services for regulating water 
regimes and for the maintenance of water 
management and hydro-technical constructions 
in the basins of the rivers Naryn – Syr Daria 
and Amu Daria. (Meeting report) 
However, at the second meeting, it was realized 
that comprehensive consideration “was possible 
only when all countries of the region participate 
in the discussion and decision-making”. Having set 
the agenda, “the session requests the Chair to duly 
inform Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan of the work 
of the PWG Energo and to make special efforts 
to invite the delegation of those participating 
SPECA countries to take part in the next session”. 
Nevertheless, at the third session (Bishkek: 18-19 
November 1999), representatives of Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan did not take part.
5.2 Water management within the 
      Talas basin
According to Krutov and Spoor (2006: 8), “both 
countries [Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan], after 
independence, continued to recognize the [water-
sharing] method and agreed to follow it”. The 
data recorded at the Pekrovka metering station 
should give evidence as to whether this was the 
case. To date, it seems that only Hutchens (1999) 
provides data for the Pekrovka metering station 
for consecutive years during the 1990s (Table 3). 
He gives the Dzhambul Irrigation Department in 
Kazakhstan as the source of his data.
According to Hutchens’ data, it appears that 
Kyrgyzstan supplied to Kazakhstan in 1997 and 
in 1998 less water during the vegetation season 
than the amount (579.6 million m3) agreed in the 
1983 protocol. Hutchens’ data (1999: 71) suggest 
that the year 1997 was a dry year, and this may 
have been the reason for the low water supply to 
Kazakhstan. However, the data for 1998 show high 
off-season water supply (after the irrigation period) 
to Kazakhstan. It is not evident whether there was 
high precipitation during that period, (according 
to Demydenko, 2004, or Krutov and Spoor, 2006, 
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this would be unlikely) or whether the water was 
kept within the Kirov reservoir during the irrigation 
season. 
As a representation of the 1990s, Demydenko 
(2004: slide 48) presents the actual water releases 
from the Kirov reservoir for the year 1994. 
According to his data, the releases were above the 
requested distribution. It would appear, therefore, 
that Kyrgyzstan over-fulﬁlled its side of the 
contract. Given Hutchens’ data, however, it seems 
that the year 1994 is not representative. This is also 
underlined by the reasoning of Demydenko himself. 
He (2004: slide 40) argues that the irrigated area 
decreased on the Kazakh side after independence 
“due to the limited water availability”. 
As in Hutchens’ study, data for the Pekrovka 
metering station for the 1990s were collected 
from the Dzhambul Irrigation Department for this 
present research. Only the data for the years 1992-
1999 were made available and are presented in 
Figure 5. Even though the data are from the same 
source, the Dzhambul Irrigation Department, the 
data do not correspond to the data presented by 
Hutchens. The collected data suggest that during 
the 1990s Kazakhstan always received more than 
the annual 716m m3 agreed in 1983. An analysis 
of the breakdown between the vegetation and 
non-vegetation period reveals that Kazakhstan 
received more water during the vegetation period 
than agreed, but the amount only once – in 1994 
– exceeded that supplied to Kazakhstan in the two 
years, 1987 and 1988, detailed in Figure 4. Thus 
the year 1994 presented by Demydenko appears to 
be non-representative. During 1994, a total ﬂow 
of 1,257.52m m3 was recorded at the Pekrovka 
metering station, of which 362.18m m3 during 
the non-vegetation and 895.34m m3 during the 
vegetation period. Because of the high ﬂow (ﬂood 
events) in 1994, one could interpret the releases 
during the non-vegetation period as emergency 
releases. 
Similar to 1994, in three other years (1995, 1998, 
and 1999) 80m to almost 100m m3 were released 
above the non-vegetation period limit of 136.4m 
m3 determined in the protocol. Compared to the 
total ﬂow for the year 1988 (1,041.5m m3), these 
years do not seem to have exceptionally high ﬂow 
(ﬂoods), therefore they would not justify emergency 
releases and the water could have been saved for 
the vegetation period (1995 and 1999) or for the 
next year (1998). 
On closer inspection within one period, the data 
suggest that whereas during the Soviet Union 
the releases peaked during the month of June, 
in four years of the 1990s the peak of releases 
occurred in July. Therefore, one could assume 
that the changed schedule had a negative effect on 
irrigated agriculture. Overall, it appears that after 
independence the water supply from the Kirov 
reservoir was not as stable and advantageous for 
Kazakhstan as during the Soviet Union.
The new Chu-Talas Commission, established in 
2005, emphasizes the good relationship between 
the two countries. They present information on 
Kazakh and Kyrgyz exploitation costs for water 
Table 3: Hutchens (1999) data on water ﬂow measured at the Pekrovka metering station (million m3). Source: adapted from 
Hutchens (1999: 71)
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC NON-
VEG
VEG
1995 11.3 68.2 95.0 58.8 131.8 108.3 133.2 112.9 52.9 20.8 20.5 14.7 230.5 597.9
1996 10.4 8.1 7.3 22.9 111.3 132.7 138.5 117.9 55.7 17.3 11.3 7.5 62.0 579.0
1997 7.3 5.8 6.6 18.3 116.6 118.5 126.9 86.3 25.9 15.2 10.2 5.9 45.8 492.5
1998 4.9 5.5 5.1 18.6 88.0 103.1 125.2 111.1 89.1 116.2 55.6 No 
data 
187.3 535.1
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facilities for the Talas river (Figure 6). A Mott 
Macdonald report (2005: Section 2.6.22) mentions 
annual bilateral protocols in which “the ﬁnancial 
participation of Kazakhstan was agreed as well as 
the list of speciﬁc objects and types of work to be 
invested. During 1998-2003, actual annual input 
of the Kazakh party was increased from 7 to 190 
thousand USD, i.e. from 3 to 71% of total sum 
of actual annual operational costs”. However, 
Hutchens (1999), who focuses on cost sharing for 
the operation and maintenance of transboundary 
infrastructure, does not mention any cost sharing 
for either Talas or Chu at that time.
If Kazakhstan was already contributing in 1998 to 
transboundary infrastructure in the Talas basin, 
then it seems that the cost sharing did not lead to 
any obvious results in terms of water releases from 
the Kirov reservoir.
6 Water management in the early 2000s
6.1 Water management within Central Asia
The presence of the international community in 
the PWG-Energo sessions increased from session 
to session. At the fourth session (5-6 April 2000), 
representatives of OSCE, Civil Aviation Planning 
Committee (CAPC), International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF), USAID, Agency for 
International Ecology Fund, TACIS, UNDP, the 
Swiss Coordination Ofﬁce as well as the Embassy 
of the Russian Federation were present. Still, 
delegations from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
did not attend. Only from the sixth session (22-23 
June 2001) onwards did Uzbekistan send observers, 
and from the eleventh session (9-11 April 2003) 
Uzbekistan sent a delegation. At the same time, the 
meeting reports suggest that the speeches were less 
political and that the issues broadened. 
Only at the ninth session (10-12 July 2002) was 
reference made to the Chu and Talas river basin. 
At this stage, it was only mentioned in an aside. 
“Mr. Libert also informed the participants about 
the course of a sub-project”, the second sub-project 
mentioned being the “joint use of Chu and Talas 
river basins by Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan”. At the 
tenth session (26-28 November 2002) there was 
again no mention of the Chu-Talas basin. During 
the eleventh session, the ﬁrst meeting of the 
project “Support for the creation of a commission 
between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan on the Chu 
and Talas rivers” took place. Four work packages 
were decided upon: drafting the structure and role 
of commission and basin councils; preparation of 
terms of reference on development of documents 
on procedures of joint ﬁnance and use of water 
Figure 5: Water recorded at the Pekrovka metering station, 1992-1999 (million m3)
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management structures; preparing suggestions 
on the basic directions of the program of public 
participation; and making certain documents 
available on the Internet (Annex 1 to meeting 
report of the eleventh session). 
It was only between 2003 and 2004, under the 
EU-TACIS: ASREWAM project, that a fact-
ﬁnding mission studied the Chu-Talas basin (main 
emphasis on the Talas basin). The international 
consultants participating in this missions (such as 
to Demydenko and Krutov) were the ones who, 
after the mission, increased the internationally 
shared knowledge about the Chu-Talas basin. 
Figure 6: Exploitation costs for water facilities on the Talas river
On 21 January 2000, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
signed the agreement on cost sharing for the 
transboundary water infrastructure in the Chu-
Talas basin. The agreement makes no reference to 
the two water sharing agreements signed in Moscow 
in 1983, but water sharing is vaguely addressed 
in the ﬁrst Article: “The Parties agree that use of 
water resources, operation and maintenance of the 
water facilities for interstate use shall be allocated 
to the mutual beneﬁt of the Parties on a fair and 
6.2 Water management within the Talas 
basin
reasonable basis”. In addition, the 2000 agreement 
makes no reference to any earlier annual bilateral 
protocols. The agreement states: “The Owning 
Party that possesses water management facilities 
of intergovernmental status has the right to 
compensation from the Utilizing Party that uses 
these facilities. The compensation shall cover 
necessary expenses to ensure their reliable and safe 
operation.” (Article 3) and “The Parties shall take 
shared part in the recovery of costs associated with 
the operation and maintenance of the facilities 
for interstate use and other agreed initiatives in 
proportion to the water received” (Article 4). 
What are the consequences of the agreement? 
According to the data from the Chu-Talas 
Commission (Figure 6), Kazakhstan’s contribution 
to the transboundary infrastructure costs has 
increased signiﬁcantly since 2000. Nevertheless, the 
data from the Pekrovka metering station for the years 
2000 to 2006 show that the agreement did not lead 
to real changes compared to the 1990s (Figure 7). 
One could question why the agreement was ratiﬁed 
by Kazakhstan in 2002. Either the non-release 
of additional water during the non-vegetation 
period in 2001 or the high water releases during 
the vegetation period (972.36 million m3 recorded 
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7 Conclusion
The data presented here, which were provided by 
the Dzhambul Irrigation Department (Kazakhstan), 
show that, with the exception of 2006, after 
independence Kyrgyzstan always fulﬁlled or 
even over-fulﬁlled its water supply obligations to 
Kazakhstan as determined in the 1983 agreement. 
However, Kyrgyzstan changed the operation of 
the Kirov reservoir. Water releases during the 
non-vegetation period became regular. Therefore 
Kyrgyzstan reduced the amount of water available 
for downstream agriculture in Kazakhstan during 
the vegetation period. In addition, instead of peak 
releases during the month of June as practiced 
during the Soviet Union, the peak releases 
varied after independence, therefore putting 
additional pressure on agriculture downstream in 
Kazakhstan.
A plausible reason for the change of operation 
could be that Kyrgyzstan utilized its strategic 
position – upstream and with the necessary water-
control infrastructure – as a bargaining tool to press 
Kazakhstan to share the operation and maintenance 
costs of the Kirov dam. This tactic was also utilized 
for the Toktogul reservoir in the Syr Darya basin. 
However, whereas Toktogul reservoir is used for 
hydropower production, the Kirov reservoir is not. 
Figure 7: Water recorded at the Pekrovka metering station in the early 2000s (million m3)
at Pekrovka) in 2002 may have trigged the ﬁnal 
ratiﬁcation. In any case, the ratiﬁcation of the 
agreement did not lead to changes either.
Whereas Demydenko (2004: slide 52) focuses 
on more technical issues for implementation: 
“problems arise in transparency, technical capability 
and methodological approaches used to determine 
water availability and therefore apportionment on 
an annual basis”, Valentini et al. (2004: 57), referring 
to the ratiﬁed interstate agreement, hint that there 
are not only technical issues: “when the document 
took effect and some experience was gained in its 
implementation, the parties considered it useful to 
create an intergovernmental commission for the 
rapid accomplishment of practical tasks”. 
Even after the Chu-Talas Commission was established 
(on 26 July 2005), there were high off-season water 
releases at the Kirov reservoir (in November 2005). 
These high off-season water releases may have caused 
water shortages and even non-compliance with the 
agreed amount to be supplied to Kazakhstan in 2006 
according to the 1981 protocol.
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In addition, even after Kazakhstan started paying in 
the late 1990s, the operation as it existed during the 
Soviet period was not reinstated. Neither did the 
agreement on sharing operation and maintenance 
costs signed in 2000, nor its ratiﬁcation in 2002, 
lead to a change of operation.  Therefore, it is 
too early to celebrate this agreement. Even the 
establishment of the joint commission did not lead 
to changes. Hence, the real success is not in basin 
cooperation, but rather in upstream hegemony.
Overall, the SPECA PWG-Energo meeting reports 
suggest that the involvement of the international 
community in the Chu-Talas basin was initially not 
anticipated. The focus of the group was clearly on 
the Syr Darya basin and maybe on the Amu Darya 
basin, not on the smaller Central Asian rivers. The 
focus was on energy and water resources, therefore 
suggesting that the focus was on reservoirs used for 
hydropower production, but this is not the case 
with the Kirov reservoir. It appears that the SPECA 
PWG initiative was unsuccessful considering its 
focus. However, it created a necessary mass of 
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The author is aware of the limitations of this data. However, to the author’s knowledge there are no data available 1. 
on the Talas basin in reviewed articles. 
attention within the international community 
– a mass that could promote the Chu-Talas sub-
project, with its call to create a basin commission, 
as a success story. The retelling of the success 
story, with the focus on the future and not on the 
past events that have triggered the agreement, 
promoted the perception of good relations between 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. It also highlighted 
the need for the international community to be 
involved in interstate cooperation. In addition, the 
SPECA PWG-Energo with its meetings in Bishkek 
gave Kyrgyzstan the possibility to inﬂuence the 
discourse on water sharing arrangements in its own 
favour.
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